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and knows practically all the girls. She is particularly friendly with some of them and takes pride in her new friendships. Her taking of the injection has nothing to do with her old belief which remains as firm as before.

In general, if not for special circumstances, the attitude of the adult population towards anti-choleric injection is not yet one of clear tolerance. The answer to the outsider's persuasion is often, "It is too painful. This is an easy refuge, which shows that the speaker in fact does not believe in its usefulness at all; for when there is need (as when a heavy illness like jaundice has befallen a person), most local men or women will not hesitate to allow native practitioners or quacks to insert long silver needles, whether in the cardiac or in the abdominal region.

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But even the priests and their assistants may not be against the injection as a personal practice. During the epidemic an assistant priest (in ordinary dress) applied for an injection at one of the stations. The man in charge of the injection asked him what "methods" he thought most effective in preventing cholera. The priest replied that he did not definitely know. The man then told him that there were three ways, as follows: (1) to drink unboiled water, (2) to read the scriptures and pray to the spirits, and lastly (3) to take an injection. Knowing that the speaker meant to be sarcastic, the priest became angry and beat a hasty retreat without the injection.

This incident was related to the author by a friend who said that he was there when it occurred. The author cannot vouch for its absolute accuracy in all details, but if it did occur as related it shows once again the intrinsic and indiscriminate desire to rely upon as many measures of safeguard as possible. But it reveals also the well known attitude of modern medical officers towards traditional ways of life. This is an extreme attitude of ignorance and intolerance. In West Town during the epidemic there were three persons with full modern medical training. The man in charge of the college infirmary is an American surgeon from Harvard Medical School and a medical missionary of the American Episcopal Church. The superintendent of the hospital is an M.D. from a provincial medical college and considered to be very well experienced through years of practice. The third is a woman, who was also connected with the local hospital. She was trained in Peiping Union Medical College. She belongs to the "Little Flock" and says that she works in the backward place only because of her mission in converting more people to her faith. None of them knows much, or is even interested, about the traditional ways of solving life's problems in the locality. The lady is most zealous in her work of conversion. She could not talk to patients or anybody else for more than five minutes without touching upon the other party's wrong faith. Nothing else is right but her faith and her way of life. The superintendent of the hospital is an earnest soul, serious and meticulous in his practice and is genuinely interested in his role as a reliever of physical distress. He asks no more questions when his medical procedure is over. To him, the local anti-choleric prayer meetings are the absurdity of absurdities.

The American missionary was born in China and has been in China for most of his life. He takes some interest in Min Chia customs, but more in reading the limited published material than in actual contact with the local people. He speaks some Chinese and shows an amazing ability in learning the Chinese calligraphy. From what the author has seen of him and of his interests, he cannot say that the man really aims at a thorough understanding of

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[redacted]

II. BASIC ATTITUDES

•184 One of the principal reasons for the stability and long life of the old order in China was its social homogeneity. The imperial government fostered uniformity of attitudes and values, and Chinese statesmen believed this to be a more binding, durable, and cheaper cement for the imperial order than government coercion. Old China was primarily a way of life, a system of values and attitudes, and on this premise the state was organized. A foreigner who wished to become "naturalized" had only to show that he accepted Chinese attitudes and values; this he did by adopting Chinese dress and speech and patterns of behavior.

This characteristic of the old order is one of the reasons why we find no important regional variations in basic attitudes. The other reason is that the Communist government is as determined, in enforcing a uniformity of values and attitudes, and far more resourceful, than was the imperial government of the past.

There are, however, certain local variations in temperament and ethos which affect, to a minor degree, the basic attitudes and values. A few of these will be noted. For the variant attitudes and values of ethnic and religious minorities, see the chapters on Ethnic Groups and Religion.

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Annex "A," Subparagraph li,
Sociological Background

INTELLECTUAL AND ARTISTIC EXPRESSION

538 184 Intellectual and artistic expression is interpreted in this chapter to mean the communication of ideals and ideas through creative and academic writing, painting, the plastic arts, dancing, and music.

The Chinese written language is the vehicle for official business and creative expression in all parts of China. Therefore the bulk of the creative and academic writing of the Southwest Region of China does not differ from that produced in China as a whole. In the past cultural activities originating in Peking and Shanghai stirred up cities like Chungking, Chengtu, and Kunming in the Southwest as well; and the support from these citie gave cultural movements originating in coastal [722] cities a national appearance. During the war with Japan, these Southwestern cities became wartime Chinese cultural centers, as the sites of the wartime campuses of the best Chinese universities. The identification of the bulk of the creative and academic writings of the Southwest with that of the Chinese nation is particularly true today when the nation is ruled by a centralized government and when all cultural innovations emanate from Peking.

538 The Chinese, especially the Chinese Communists often speak of literature and the arts as *one*. In the Communists' policy statements, what pertains

181 adapt to change, and less likely to show enthusiasm for the Communist program. The rich, who have more to lose, are generally more dissatisfied with the Communist regime than their poorer countrymen. These patterns of attitudes tend to cut across occupational stratification. In view of the technical limitations imposed on this discussion, occupational stratification will be used, with allowance for the exceptions within each category.

I. FARMERS

565 184 The rich absentee-landowners of China, whose social status ranks with that of government bureaucrats and whose interests are identified with those of rich merchants, are all but nonexistent in Mainland China today. The Chinese farmer class consists chiefly of poor peasants and "middle farmers" holding small lots of land. These people have had little opportunity to identify themselves with the state or its destiny. Especially in Southwest China, where warlords ruled until the outbreak of the war of resistance against Japan, the development of a national feeling among the farmers has been late and slow. However, the cessation 565 722 of what used to be perpetual skirmishes between 184 warlords and the presence of a single centralized authority during World War II furnished many farmers in this region with a basis on which to form a concept of nationalism. Although no part of Southwest China was overrun by Japanese troops, the experiences of enemy bombings, anti-Japanese propaganda, and contact with refugees made

565 many farmers realize that the Yangtze River
722 gorges were not a dependable natural defense,
184 and that they could no longer live in an "isolated utopia" in West China, as Szechwan Province had been traditionally regarded.

The Communists have been making intensive efforts to "educate" the farmers. Although the learning of a few political terms is not enough to make the farmer nationalistic, at least he knows more about China as a nation than he ever did in the past.

423 The idea that he is to be given land of his own
565 (and concomitant responsibility) probably has
184 generated apprehension even in the poorest peasant who always believed he wanted to own land. To be sure, his gain through the process of land reform must have given the peasant some satisfaction, but subsequent grain taxes remain heavy and Communist efforts to collectivize the production and marketing of farm produce impose restrictions on the farmer. Compared with Central-South China, land reform and the establishment of cooperatives were carried out rapidly and with less resistance in this region. The fact that all farmers have been permitted to retain title to their land has led the peasantry to give support to the regime. Good crops, which have made this a grain-surplus region since 1953, helped to maintain the illusion of a prospering society.

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177 The Chinese farmer's picture of a foreign
565 culture was originally derived from contact with

199 565 184 foreign missionaries. In Southwest China, foreign churches were seen only in a few larger cities. The presence of American troops in Kunming, Chengtu, and a few other cities where military installations were located during the war against Japan made possible a different view of the foreigner. The farmer's reaction to the sight of a swashbuckling American soldier was generally puzzlement, envy, and a measure of disapproval. But on the whole, very few farmers in this region have had much experience with foreigners, nor did anti-foreign uprisings in the past directly involve the Southwestern farmer. The frightening image of "Western imperialism" created by Communist propaganda organs, therefore, is likely to pose no meaningful threat to these long-isolated people. The majority of the farmers in this region are not concerned with the fate of foreign missionaries in Communist China.

565 184 The Chinese farmer has always hoped to safeguard his family by acquiring more land to provide a better education for his children and to maintain the respect of fellow villagers. Now that the farmer's hopes for obtaining land are strictly limited, his interest turns to finding ways in which his children, through education, can advance on the socio-economic ladder. The fact that many young people from peasant families have been absorbed into the government "cadre" system may induce the Chinese farmer to look more kindly upon the present regime. Of course, there are exceptions among the farming population. Farmers active in secret societies, which

575 Farmers active in secret societies, which
565 are traditionally opposed to government control,
184 may have a different set of attitudes toward the nation, foreigners, and the individual's role in society. The I-kuan Tao (Way of Pervading Unity) sect was reported active as late as the summer of 1955 and apparently has survived Communist efforts to stamp it out. Other secret societies are of minor importance in comparison with those operating in Central-South or East China

II. URBAN WORKERS

565 Southwest China had been backward in indus-
178 trial development until the late 1930's when
184 some industrial plants were moved from the coastal areas to places like Chungking and Wanhsien in Szechwan Province. Even as late as 1952 there were still very few industrial workers in this region. Most of them were not organized until after 1949 and were not involved in earlier political movements. Before unionization, industrial workers in Southwest China had no greater national feeling than was commong among the farmers.

565 The Communists' avowed attempt to raise
184 the status of the worker must have given the worker a feeling of importance as he learned of the Communists' economic reconstruction plan. He derives a measure of pride when a steel plant is erected or when a bridge is built, although he may not really believe that the workers, as the Communists say, are the masters of the New China. Other promised benefits, including job security and welfare provisions, also add to the popularity of the Communist regime among the workers, despite the fact that most

565 of these benefits are limited and there have been
184 only a small number of beneficiaries.

565 On the liability side of the Communist policy
466 toward the worker are: the lack of substantial
184 increase in the standard of living, a harsher work schedule and loss of leisure time, and growing disillusionment as it becomes obvious that the "proletariat" has not really become the master of the New China. The recent let-up in "labor emulation" drives and the sudden flurry of official warnings against overwork and overly rigid demands upon the time and temper of the laborer indicate that the laboring class is not necessarily most productive under pressure. In addition, the worker's attitude may also be greatly influenced by the rise of a new, Communist-fostered managerial class, which, for whatever reasons, receives more benefits than does manual labor.

565 Foreign advisers had been employed in many
648 Chinese factories in pre-Communist days, and many workers may have become accustomed to recognizing the general excellence of Western technology. However, any government effort to impose foreign leadership in technical fields may injure the pride of the worker and provoke his resentment. There is no evidence to suggest that many Russian technicians or advisers are employed in factories in this region, or that those employed have caused resentment among the native workers.

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The Chinese worker has not abandoned his aspiration of personal advancement in the material sense. The promotion of the young and ambitious to serve in the huge government bureaucracy may satisfy some of the workers, but the lack of a substantial increase in their standard of living will lead many to feel that their aspirations cannot be fulfilled under the Communist regi me.

III. STUDENTS AND INTELLECTUALS

Of all the groups of people in China, the intellectuals are probably the most varied in their attitudes. They do not constitute a "class," hence their attitudes do not show any distinctive "group" characteristics. There are those whose strong convictions make them active leaders of social and political movements in defiance of authoritarian rule; there are others whose education and experience make them flexible under pressure. Hence no dependable conclusion on the attitudes of the Chinese intellectuals as a group has been arrived at.

Although the attitudes of Chinese intellectuals may differ, the great majority of them are exceedingly patriotic. It is therefore conceivable that to some of them at least the Communist emphasis on loyalty to the state rather than the traditional loyalty to the family must have a great appeal. There is reason to believe that most of them who accepted Communism in 1949 did so because they saw in the Communist program some hope of restoring China to a position of power among the nations. After five years of Communist

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184 rule, some of the intellectuals are probably elated by the truculence with which Red China has been conducting its foreign affairs, and by the feeling that China, at long last, has been unified. But on the negative side, severe restrictions on intellectual freedom have been imposed by the Communists. Furthermore, the Communist policy of gradually substituting the freshly trained and well-indoctrinated intellectuals for those who have had a "liberal" or "conservative" background must have created a feeling of insecurity among many of the intellectual group.

Traditionally, Chinese intellectuals aspired to high positions in the government, the principal means to wealth, social esteem, and influence. For those intellectuals who still harbor such personal amibitons, it must be heartening to see people with no seniority in either the Party hierarchy or the government bureaucracy among the ranks of the nation's leaders in all fields. For others, who have modified their personal ambitions and who sincerely wish to make their training useful to the country, something they have not been able to do for many years, Peking's policy of finding a place for intellectuals in the national reconstruction program is undoubtedly welcomed. So far, the vast underdeveloped areas in Southwest China have offered a great challenge to the educated, and many who accepted assignments in such areas have been reported to feel that they finally have started contributing to the welfare of their country. However, it must be remembered that in an effort to place college graduates and other trained personnel where they are most needed, the Communist govern-

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ment has been guilty of misassignments which have caused dissatisfaction and open criticism in the Communist press.

Since the early days of the Chinese Communist movement, the Communists have always had enthusiastic support among most of the students. Many loyal Communist cadres are recruited from among the students who, so far, have not shown any lack of enthusiasm for the Communist cause. But while accepting Communism as their ideal, the students may not be able to entirely suppress a simultaneous impulse toward individualism. Furthermore, they may also find the reality of Communism or the individual's place in the regime less exciting and idealistic than promised by Communist preachments.

V. BUSINESSMEN AND INDUSTRIALISTS

Few industrialists are left in Communist China today, but small-businessmen and manufacturers, who made up the larger part of China's urban population continue to exist in reduced numbers. The merchant has always occupied an inferior position in the traditional Chinese social strata, while industry is something relatively new, and an industrialist's position in Chinese society has yet to be clearly defined. In general, merchants and manufacturers, who had been forced to operate under government restrictions even in pre-Communist days, are cool-headed realists. They are not easily swayed by high-sounding phrases. There have been few occasions when symbols of the state could evoke sentiment among the merchants and small manufacturers

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except, perhaps, at a time when foreign goods flooded the Chinese market and caused dislocation in the Chinese economy.

Under the Peking regime, businessmen and industrialists as a group fare badly (possibly not much better than rich landowners), and the general mood in industrial and commercial circles is most probably unfavorable toward the government. The Communists have made it clear that small businessmen and manufacturers are only tolerated in the transitional stage of the "New Democracy," and that there will be no room for private enterprise in the socialist society which is the ultimate goal of the Communist regime. Meanwhile, these people have to carry a large share of the tax burden and face the stiff competition of and regulation by state enterprises. There is evidence that the businessmen and manufacturers, accustomed as they are to government interference, are finding the controls imposed by the Communist government increasingly harsh and ever more difficult to evade. In Southwest China, this mood may not be easily discernible since there are fewer large commercial and industrial centers.

If profit has been the most common motive among businessmen and manufacturers, under present circumstances they have been forced to abandon or at least restrain their amibitons. Some members of this class who were allowed to do so have made a second choice -- that of changing their careers. The more adaptable have escaped the purges by co-operating with

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565 the Communist regime. In this connection, the
184 Communists have appointed a few erstwhile influential industrialists to serve in the government; it may be merely a conciliatory gesture of the Communists to win the support of small business, but it does provide this class of people with one temporary alternative to their lost hope.

Ad additional factor in provoking dissatisfaction among the merchants is the control on export trade. Southwest China has a few traditionally profitable export commodities, such as tung-oil, hog bristles, and foodstuffs. Now that the government has virtually completed its monopoly of export trade, the merchants are denied of the opportunity to take part in this lucrative undertaking.

V. WOMEN

562 The customary position of women in China
184 is subordinate to that of men. This tradition is so deep-rooted that it took superhuman courage for the first women to claim their rights in pre-Communist days; and the pain of "emancipation" continues under the Communists.

To the "emancipated" belongs responsibility; this is at least theoretically true, and the Chinese women who have thus assumed more active roles in society are generally expected to have a degree of political consciousness similar to that of men

562 of equal education and comparable environment.
184 In many cases women prove to be even more "patriotic" than men as a result of the unprecedented government effort to show the women that they, too, can achieve enviable social recognition by a show of nationalism.

How much improvement in the status of women has been brought about by the Communists? Women are encouraged to participate in political activities and industry; they are provided with facilities for child care and adult education, as well as other welfare benefits if they will join the working force. If the increase in the number of women workers in factories can be taken as an indication of the women's own free choice, then women in Communist China may indeed feel favorably disposed toward the Communist regime. But upon closer observation this may not be the case; many women are reluctant to work in factories and those who undertook factory work after 1949 may have done so as a financial necessity rather than as a result of free choice.

The much-publicized Marriage Law in Communist China embodies nothing new in principle but its vigorous and often arbitrary enforcement is unprecedented. Acceptance of this law will mean the destruction of some of the most stubborn traditions in China (See discussion of the Marriage Law in the chapter on Family).

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562 184 Some women hold high posts in government, and there are "labor heroines" in all industries. Housewives of well-to-do families in larger cities may live in leisure. Those of families of modest means may have to accept employment, but as long as the work does not require strength, they do not resent it. The age-group differential asserts itself in the reaction of women to the new regime; older women who had learned to live in peace with the extended family system are likely to dread the Communist effort to reduce the extended family to the conjugal family; young women are more apt to feel favorably disposed toward the Peking regime.

562 369 184 A sharp difference in attitude is to be observed between the women in such urban centers as Chungking and Chengtu, and those in the vast frontier areas where little urbanization has taken place. City life, plus opportunity to receive education in new schools, had caused changes in attitudes among women in urban centers even before the Communist regime announced its policy with regard to women and their status in society. Such women are likely to expect much of their "emancipation" and resent the Communist effort to add them to the labor force. To them sustained Communist indoctrination may amount to boredom. In the outlying villages, women remain more strictly tradition-bound and are less prepared to accept the new roles the Communists have assigned them.

VI. MINORITY NATIONALITIES

513 184 Among the regions in China proper, the Southwest has the largest number of ethnic

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minority groups. Traditionally isolated to varying degrees, these groups had been given little reason to feel favorably disposed toward a central government in China: in their eyes, a central authority appeared a threat to their traditional way of life. Until it has been proven that by identifying themselves as a part of the "greater" Chinese community they would be in a better position to realize their aspirations, it would be difficult for these groups to share the national feelings of the Han-Chinese.

The Communist government has been trying to cultivate a feeling of kinship between all the ethnic groups and to assimilate the minority nationals without provoking their resentment. Preferential treatment has been extedned minority nationals who left their villages for the Han-Chinese areas. Many of the ethnic minorities have been granted "autonomous" status by the Central People's Government to win their support. Schools have been established and languages designed for the minority groups so that Communist ideology can be taught to them. Special efforts have been made to publicize the achievements of individuals belonging to such groups. All these measures are meant to foster a favorable attitude among the minority groups toward the Peking regime.

It is impossible to measure the success or failure of the Communist policy toward the minority groups at this stage. However, it appears reasonable to say that the Communists have been doing more to win support from these groups than to alienate them.

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VII. OTHER GROUPS

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In addition to the groups discussed, there are other groups which, although minor in numerical strength, are of importance because their attitudes have significant bearing on the tensions in Chinese society.

It is evident that all Communist Party members and all government bureaucrats do not necessarily have the same attitudes, in spite of the fact that they are regimented by a well-controlled machine. High-ranking Communist officials exhibited intense feelings of Party loyalty and dedication to the "cause" in the early days of their careers, and so far there has been no indication that their feelings have changed. Granted that the behind-the-scene struggle for personal power in a Soviet system is most difficult to discern, the top Communist leaders in Southwest China have yet to offer evidence of power-seeking at the risk of disrupting Party harmony and hegemony. Those who contributed to the victory of the Communists received assignment commensurate with their service, and they seem to remain active and content with their positions.

The personnel in lower Party echelons are subject to tremendous pressures from all sides. Even the most devoted Party workers are expected to repeatedly prove their loyalty to the Communist regime. The fact that the Party relies

165 on close surveillance and an atmosphere of
184 fear in order to keep members in line indicates the existence of dissatisfaction and dissidence within the Party ranks. The expansion of a bureaucracy necessitates the promotion of numerous lower-level Party functionaries. This certainly tends to make the old Party cadres resentful when they see the rise of new cadres to positions equal to or higher than their own. Generally speaking, cadres assigned to rural areas are less enthusiastic about the regime than those in urban areas who live in more comfortable circumstances and have more frequent opportunities for advancement.

Former Nationalist officials had their darkest days during the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, when almost all lived under the imminent threat of violence and death. After these intensive campaigns had subsided, a few former Kuomintang personnel remained among the Communist government bureaucrats. Even former warlords who has chosen to co-operate with the Communists have been assigned government positions without true authority, but which at least insure their livelihood and prestige. A sense of insecurity may continue to affect some members of this group, but as time goes on they will consolidate their positions in the "new" society.

VIII. CONCLUSION

184 The Communist system of multiple control, which extends to all aspects of life, and the Communist effort to maintain a strong tie with

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184 Russia are two major causes of dissatisfaction among the Chinese people. Regimentation, when carried to the extreme, provokes the resistance of the people. Subservience to Russia destroys the spirit of nationalism which the Communists have been trying to cultivate in China. Vigorous and continuous government efforts to promote friendship with Russia through the extensive Sino-Soviet Frendship Association is an indirect admission that anti-Russian feeling either already exists or can easily develop.

The general patterns of attitudes we have discussed can serve only as indications of the prevailing social mood among various groups. Sociologists agree that it is difficult to predict group response. This, it appears, must apply to a study of a people so various in temperament as the Chinese.

2: Rock K-5 (1934-) 1947 AF16 Southwest China AF16
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S 114 484 ch'uan, who had been settled there for more than 60 years. They, like the Mo-so who dwell in this gorge, do not live, as he says, in "caves à demi enfoncées dans le sol," but in houses built of stone. His map on plate 6 gives the trail as below the villages, while actually it passes above them and not along the river but at times 4,000 feet above it. The great Ta-shen-kou gorge, which the trail ascends and its eastern wall which it climbs in many zigzags, is not marked. According to him the trail leads only a short distance above the river. This is an impossibility. No one could walk along the Hu-t'iao-chiang or cross the Ta-shen-kou gorge without ascending it.

From Ta-ku, as well as from across the river, one can look up the tremendous gorge, and from the village of No-yü near the entrance one can look down it and obtain an idea of its grandeur, though not to the extent as if one actually travels through it. The quickest way to reach Bbĕr-ddĕr is by crossing the Yangtze at Ta-ku. Bacot gives us pictures of the inflated goatskin rafts by which he crossed, but not a single picture of the great gorge itself or of the renowned Hu-t'iao-chiang, nor of the villages in the gorge, as previously remarked.

As the northern part of the Chung-tien district is inhabited mainly by Tibetans no detailed description is here given, but the southern territory inhabited purely by Na-khi is dealt with in the following pages.

1. THE NA-KHI DISTRICTS OF HA-BA AND BBĔR-DDĔR (THE CHINESE HA-PA 哈巴 AND PEI-TI 北地)

S 131 The districts of Ha-ba and Bbĕr-ddĕr are situated in the south-eastern part of the Chung-tien triangle and rest on the Yangtze loop in the east; on the Ha-ba ndshĕr nv-lv peak of the Yü-lung Shan in the south; the Ta-ra mountain in the west and Pei-ti Shan (A-nà Ngyu Range) to the north. The massive limestone range of Gkü-dü also lies within the triangle.

S ST [184] 771 The most primitive type of Na-khi, undisturbed since they first settled many centuries ago, dwell in this region. Here they follow their old religious customs, which is a mixture of Shamanism and the pre-Buddhistic Bön religion of Tibet. There are neither lamas nor lamá temples as in the Li-chiang district, nor are there any Chinese temples, for no Chinese live here.

S ST [764] [755] An interesting feature is the total absence of graves in Bbĕr-ddĕr, for here the Na-khi still follow their ancient custom of cremating their dead. They take no medicines of any kind, but rely solely on their sorcerers to exorcize the demons of disease. They also practise in all its purity the ancient ceremony of *Muaṉ-bpö* (Propitiation of Heaven). The district contains one of the finest *muaṉ-bpö d'a*, or sites for the *Muaṉ-bpö* ceremony, situated in a beautiful grove of old oaks.

S ST 177 [579] Their territory is most difficult of access and this has kept them isolated and unspoiled. They have not come in contact with the Chinese, but, unfortunately, they are exposed in the north to Tibetan bandit invasion, and several times their villages have been reduced to ashes and their cattle driven off. Being unarmed, they themselves fled into the hills to save their lives.

S 631 They are under the Chinese magistrate of Chung-tien, a town in a purely Tibetan district, but that official, when there happens to be one, usually flies

751 757 578 184 the customary ways of the people among whom he is working. He knows patches here and there and has a way of jumping from one question rapidly to another, so that the questioned will usually have no difficulty in seeing the ephemeral nature of his interest in the things he has asked about. He and family live in a temple where one of the prayer meetings took place and lasted for three days and nights. His sister told the author that during the nights they (the family) asked them to stop the noise again and again in vain. Now, granted it is very unpleasant to have that amount of noise in the courtyard when one is trying to sleep, the objectors evidently had never given a moment's thought to the possibility that some villagers might decide to go to the missionary's church on a Sunday morning to ask the preacher to stop talking. (The author cannot tell whether the actual asking them to "stop the noise" took the crude form the lady described. The assumption here is that the medical missionary and his family did ask them in some way to stop the noise.)

The author has described the attitude of these three medical persons not with any intention of contempt or even any personal disapproval, but merely by way of showing how some representatives of modern medical science react in a rustic culture. And the matter extends way beyond these three medical practitioners. They show how very little difference there is between such an attitude and the general attitude of missionaries and other religionists towards the traditional ways and doings in any rustic culture in which they are working. The religionist's attitude may be illustrated by the public expression of the husband of the lady doctor in West Town. He and his wife both belong to the "Little Flock" and are the moving spirits of the group. He is a jewel merchant from overseas and speaks fluent English. He expressed himself very strongly in public regarding the epidemic: "If one can trust God (by prayer) and take precautions (medical) at the same time, then all is well and good. If however one has to choose between the two, I trust God and prayers alone." He takes no injection and condemns the local people thus: "What is wrong with the West Town folks is that they do not trust God nor take precautions."

D. The Gods have Answered the Appeal

757 813 A few days before the last large-scale prayer meeting in Area E took place, rain began to fall. The general temperature suffered a sudden drop. During this prayer meeting the sky remained cloudy and rain was sporadic. From the day after this meeting was over torrential rain fell continuously for a week and the temperature dropped further. As the optimum temperature for choleric bacteria is somewhere around 27°C. and the temperature must not be too far below that when carried from one agent to another, the epidemic was thus over.(14) Another piece of irrefutable evidence of the efficacy of the main body of the traditional ways in dealing with Wen (epidemic) was thus firmly established in the memory of the local people. No local person ever mentioned a word about the drop in temperature and its relation to the behavior of the epidemic, nor was there any great discussion of the efficacy of the prayer meetings, of the taboos on food and on dirt, or of the native prescriptions. Most of these are taken as a matter of course and therefore not matters for reflection. Even the modern injection attracts no more

(14) "The association of high relative humidity with high temperature, accompanied by intermittent rains, forms the most favorable atmosphere for the development of the disease, and the presence of endemic centers from which epidemics may at any time spring, must also be accepted." (Manson's Tropical Diseases, edited by Philip H. Manson-Bahr, 1936, p. 439.) Also, "The bacillus grows best in alkaline media at a temperature of from 30°C. to 40°C. Growth is arrested below 15°C. or above 42°C. A temperature over 50°C. kills the bacillus." (Ibid., p. 440.)